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O'Connell: THE POPULAR BUT UNLAWFUL ARMED REPRISAL

The Popular but Unlawful Armed Reprisal
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL
In the early morning hours of April 6, 2017, United States President
Donald Trump ordered an unprecedented attack on a Syrian Air Force
base.1 The U.S. Navy fired fifty-nine Tomahawk Cruise missiles from ships
in the Mediterranean, reportedly killing nine, including four children, and
damaging property.2 Trump announced that the attack was a response to the
Syrian government’s alleged use of chemical weapons days earlier, in which
seventy-two died.3 Syria denied carrying out the chemical attack, and the
U.S. offered no public legal justification for its actions. 4 Nevertheless, the
French and German governments issued a joint press release stating that the
U.S. attacks were a “just and proportionate” response to the use of chemical
weapons.5 Indeed, the U.S. attacks were generally met with approval in the
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1. Jason Le Miere, Trump’s Attack on Syria Killed Four Children, State News Agency Claims,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 7, 2017, 11:10 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/syria-attack-children-civilian-killed580555.
2. Id.
3. Jason Collie & Francesa Gillet, Syria Air Strikes: UK Backs Donald Trump’s Cruise Missile
Strike in Response to Assad’s Chemical Attack Which Killed 72 Civilians, EVENINGSTANDARD (Apr. 7,
2017, 5:47 PM), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/us-launches-cruise-missile-strike-on-syriaafter-chemical-attack-that-killed-72-people-a3509446.html.
4. See Sabrina Siddiqui & Lauren Gambino, Are Donald Trump’s Missile Strikes in Syria
Legal?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2017, 5:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/07/donaldtrump-us-missile-strikes-syria-legal.
5. Chiara Palazzo & Peter Foster, ‘Assad Bears Full Responsibility’: How the World Reacted to
Donald Trump’s Missile Strike on Syria, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Apr. 7, 2017, 6:37 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-air-strike-syria-world-reacted-donald-trumps-decisionintervene/; see Aldo Zammit Borda, The Precedent Set by the US Reprisal Against the Use of Chemical
Weapons in Syria, EJIL: TALK! (May 1, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-precedent-set-by-the-usreprisal-against-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/comment-page-1/#comment-251292 (suggesting
that Syria’s use of chemical weapons created extenuating circumstances mitigating otherwise unlawful
action).
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West.6 In the U.S., they were among President Trump’s most popular
actions in his first year in office. 7
On June 18, 2017, Iran launched missiles into eastern Syria targeting a
town held by ISIS forces following violence on June 7 at Iran’s parliament
and a shrine in Tehran that left at least eighteen dead and more than fifty
wounded.8 ISIS claimed responsibility for the incident.9 Iran’s government
stated its aim in attacking was “to punish the terrorists for the twin attacks
on the Iranian parliament and the holy shrine of the late founder of the
Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini . . . .”10 Iran also threatened to retaliate
in the same way in the future if provoked.11 It was the first time in thirty
years that Iran had fired missiles outside its territory, and while it is true that
Iran has been assisting the government of Bashar al Assad in the civil war in
Syria, the purpose of the June 18 attacks was retaliation.12 Iran’s Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “vowed Iran would slap its enemies.”13
Concern about Iran’s use of missiles was voiced by several states.14 The
criticism did not specify that Iran had violated international law.15
On April 14, 2018, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
fired over 100 missiles at three sites in Syria.16 Syria reported property
damage but no casualties as a direct result of the action. The strikes
followed one week after reports that the Syrian government had again used
6. E.A. Crunden & Esther Yu Hsi Lee, International Leaders Weigh in on U.S. Strike in Syria,
THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 7, 2017, 3:33 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/international-response-to-syriastrike-1bd28add73c3/.
7. Glenn Greenwald, Spoils of War: Trump Lavished with Media and Bipartisan Praise for
Bombing Syria, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 7, 2017, 10:43 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/04/07/thespoils-of-war-trump-lavished-with-media-and-bipartisan-praise-for-bombing-syria/.
8. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran Targets ‘Terrorists’ in Missile Strike on Isis-held Syrian Town,
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/18/iran-targetsterrorists-in-missile-strike-on-isis-held-syrian-town. ‘ISIS’ is an acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria, a group also known by the acronym ‘ISIL’, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. See ALI
SOUFAN, ANATOMY OF TERROR: FROM THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN TO THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
xvi (2017). Increasingly, the group is known as “Daesh,” the Arabic form of the acronym. ISIS is an
offshoot of the terrorist organization, Al Qaeda. The two groups separated, and ISIS has been
denounced by the main Al Qaeda organization. See id.
9. Dehghan, supra note 8.
10. Id.
11. Iran Fires Missiles at ISIL Positions in Eastern Syria, ALJAZEERA (June 18, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/iran-fires-missiles-isil-positions-eastern-syria170618193251349.html.
12. Id.; Dehghan, supra note 8.
13. Iran Fires Missiles at ISIL Positions in Eastern Syria, supra note 11.
14. See Mehdi Jedinia, Iran Escalates Involvement in Syria with Anti-IS Missile Strike, VOA
(June
21,
2017,
4:45
PM),
https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-escalates-involvement-insyria/3910361.html.
15. See id.
16. Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Ben Hubbard, U.S., Britain, and France Strike Over
YORK
TIMES,
April
13,
2018),
Suspected
Chemical
Weapons
Attack,
NEW
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-strikes-syria-attack.html.
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chemical weapons in opposition areas. Only the United Kingdom attempted
to cite a legal basis for the resort to force. Prime Minister Theresa May’s
office issued a statement saying the missile attacks were justified as
“humanitarian intervention . . .”17 After the action, at a debate at the UN,
U.S. representative Nikki Haley, merely said it was “justified, legitimate,
and proportionate” without any attempt to provide the legal basis for finding
it justified. The French UN representative said the attacks were a response
to the Syrian regime’s unlawful use of chemical weapons. He did not
answer the Bolivian representative’s question, asking why it was lawful to
violate the prohibition on force to respond to the unlawful use of chemical
weapons.18
Despite the express and implied support for the attacks on Syria on all
three dates, retaliatory attacks are clearly prohibited by international law.19
International law generally prohibits the use of force except in self-defense,
with the UN Security Council’s authorization, or in some cases with the
invitation of a government.20 Retaliation or reprisals are after-the-fact
responses that do not fit the exception for self-defense and would thus need
Security Council authorization or an invitation to join in a lawful use of
force by, in this case, Syria’s government.21 Prior to the Trump
administration, the U.S. consistently attempted to justify retaliatory uses of
force as by characterizing the facts to fit the self-defense or invitation
17. ‘Syria
Action
–
UK
Government
Legal
Position’,
14
April
2018,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-ukgovernment-legal-position.
18. Sewell Chan, U.N. Security Council Rejects Russian Resolution Condemning Syria Strikes,
N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/middleeast/un-securitycouncil-syria-airstrikes.html.
19. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. “Few propositions about international law have enjoyed more
support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of
reprisals is illegal.” Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(1972). Bowett supports this conclusion by spending most of the article attempting to create a new
justification for resort to reprisals. See, e.g., id. at 26-28. For an author who shares Bowett’s interest in
seeing a new exception to permit reprisals, see, William O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and SelfDefense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 421 (1990). For a thorough rejection of
these arguments in favor of legalizing reprisals, see, Roberto Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE (A. Cassese ed., 1986). By 2018, Gray found the law
against reprisals unchanged. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 160,
162, and 205 (2018).
20. Shane Darcy, Retaliation and Reprisal, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 879 (Marc Weller et al., eds., 2015).
21. Id. at 881. Darcy provides a definition but one that relies on a term with no legal definition,
war: “Such reprisals . . . can be considered as acts of forcible self-help, involving an unlawful use of
force falling short of war, by one state in response to a prior violation of international law by another.
‘Armed reprisals’ is the most suitable label for such actions.” Id. Darcy goes on to note that Antonio
Cassese considered reprisals to be “‘aimed at either impelling the delinquent state to discontinue the
wrongdoing, or at punishing it, or both.’” Id. at 882 (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
299 (2005)).
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paradigms.22 While those arguments generally fell short,23 they at least
recognized the law, unlike the decision to offer no legal justification
following either the April 2018 or April 2017 attacks.24
The implications of these latest violations of international law on the
use of force for the world are grave.25 Human lives have been taken
through missile attacks amidst indications of declining knowledge and
respect for the law.26 Such disrespect has repercussions.27 The U.S.,
France, the UK, and Iran want ISIS to comply with human rights and to
denounce terrorism and violence of all kinds, yet, such demands lack
credibility when those issuing them do not themselves comply with
international law’s most important rules.28 Moreover, disrespect for the law
in one area can weaken the system as a whole, a system that extends from
the principle of non-intervention to regulation of cyber space.29
One thesis of this article is that disrespect for the prohibition on
reprisals is owing in part to lack of knowledge respecting what the law
actually requires.30 The first part of the discussion provides a brief
overview of the law relevant to the use of force in general and armed
reprisals in particular.31 The second part focuses on past U.S. attempts to fit
armed reprisals into the self-defense exception.32 The article concludes that
these past attempts weakened respect for the law, paving the way for the
American and Iranian attacks in Syria and the muted world reaction to
them.33 Despite any short-term gratification the attacks brought, long term
they undermine the interest in avoiding a lawless world that both the U.S.
and Iran seem to desire.34 Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in
22. See, e.g., Micah Zenko, How the Obama Administration Justifies Targeted Killings, COUNCIL
REL. (July 5, 2012), https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-obama-administration-justifies-targetedkillings.
23. Amanda Taub, Experts: Obama’s Legal Justification for the War on ISIS is “a Stretch”,
VOX (Sept., 12, 2014, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/iraq-crisis/2014/9/12/6134159/is-obamas-newisis-strategy-legal.
24. Siddiqui, supra note 4.
25. Jan Lemnitzer, Is Trump’s Strike in Syria Changing International Law?, CONVERSATION
(Apr. 11, 2017, 10:46 PM), http://theconversation.com/is-trumps-strike-in-syria-changing-internationallaw-76073.
26. Miere, supra note 1.
27. Lemnitzer, supra note 25.
28. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html (last
visited May 29, 2018).
29. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Brandeis stated, “If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself”.).
30. See infra The Prohibition on the Use of Force, notes 37-117 and accompanying text.
31. See id.
32. See infra The Prohibition on Armed Reprisals, notes 118-249 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Conclusion, notes 250-257 and accompanying text.
34. Lemnitzer, supra note 25.
ON FOREIGN
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October 2017, demanded that China, for example, adhere to the world’s
“rules-based order.”35 All rules-based systems begin with the prohibition on
the unauthorized use of force.36
THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE
Following centuries of evolution to which political leaders, scholars,
popular movements, religious leaders, and others contributed, most
sovereign states in the world agreed to a treaty rule in 1945 that generally
prohibits the use of force.37 The rule is at the heart of the United Nations
Charter, a multilateral treaty that established the United Nations
organization and set rules and principles for member states.38 The first line
of the Charter provides the UN’s purpose: “We the peoples of the United
Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war
. . . .” agree to be bound by the terms of the Charter.39 Chapter I, Article
1(1) further emphasizes the purpose of the UN and the principles the
organization seeks to foster:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace[.]40
Article 2(4) specifically prohibits resort to force by states: “All members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”41
The Charter’s drafters intended Chapter I, Article 2(4) to be a general
prohibition on the use of force, a fact that becomes evident when it is read
in the context of the Charter as a whole and its negotiating history.42
Chapter VI of the Charter mandates that disputes be settled peacefully.43
Chapter VII provides the only two express Charter-based exceptions to
35. Nicole Gaouette, Tillerson Raps China as ‘Predatory’ Rule Breaker, CNN (Oct. 19, 2017,
2:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/18/politics/tillerson-china-rebuke-speech/index.html.
36. Id.
37. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
38. See generally, U.N. Charter.
39. Id. pmbl.
40. Id. art. 1 ¶ 1.
41. Id. art. 2, ¶ 4.
42. Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 271, 278 (1985).
43. U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1.
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Article 2(4).44 Articles 39–42 enumerate the powers of the UN Security
Council to authorize force for the purpose of restoring international peace
and security.45 Chapter VII, Article 51 permits the use of force in individual
and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, until the Security
Council acts.46 The Charter also promotes human rights and economic
development to mitigate some of the well-known causes of conflict.47
Chapter XV, Article 99 authorizes the UN Secretary General to bring any
matter that may threaten international peace and security to the attention of
the Security Council.48
U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt commissioned the drafting of the
Charter in 1939.49 The U.S. also organized the final negotiating session in
San Francisco in 1945.50 The records from San Francisco confirm that the
drafters intended Article 2(4) to be a comprehensive ban on the use of
force.51 A member of the U.S. delegation in responding to a question by the
Brazilian delegation on the scope of Article 2(4) said, the authors of the
original text intended “to state in the broadest terms an absolute allinclusive prohibition; the phrase ‘or in any other manner’ was designed to
insure that there should be no loopholes.”52 The negotiating history also
confirms that Article 2(4) covers the use of armed force in distinction to
more general forceful or coercive measures not involving the use of force,
such as economic sanctions, 53 cyber-attacks, or minimal uses of force such
as those involved in law enforcement. 54
The broad prohibition on resort to force in Article 2(4) was paired with
only one exception in the original draft, force authorized by the Security
Council.55 The Council must first consider measures short of force.56 If
these are found inadequate, measures involving armed force may be used to
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. arts. 39-42, 51.
Id. arts. 39-42.
Id. art. 51.
Id. art. 1, ¶ 3.
U.N. Charter art. 99.
See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
A STORY OF SUPERPOWERS, SECRET AGENTS, WARTIME ALLIES AND ENEMIES, AND THEIR QUEST FOR A
PEACEFUL WORLD 33-34 (2003).
50. Id. at 34, 111.
51. U.N. Conference on International Organization, E/F.752/24 (June 4, 1945).
52. Id.
53. See id. (discussing the rejection of a proposal by Brazil to extend the prohibition on force to
economic coercion).
54. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Prohibition of the use of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM
107 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson, eds., 2013); but see Thomas Ruys, The Meaning of Force
and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are Minimal Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article
2(4)?, 108 AM. J. 159, 163 (2014).
55. U.N. Charter art. 42.
56. Id. arts. 40-41.
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re-establish international peace.57 Latin American states at San Francisco
became concerned that their proposed treaty for collective self-defense
might conflict with the Article 2(4)/Security Council regime in the
Charter.58 Article 2(4) could be construed as requiring a state to get
Security Council authorization prior to assisting another state that had been
attacked in violation of Article 2(4), so59 the Latin American States
requested an additional exception.60 In response, the U.S. delegation drafted
a new, narrow provision permitting self-defense and collective self-defense
in an emergency case where an “armed attack occurs” until the Security
Council acts.61 The new provision became Article 51.62
The U.S. delegation discussed the possibility of allowing resort to selfdefense in anticipation of an armed attack.63 This however was rejected.64
One member of the delegation, Senator Harold Stassen, explained: “We did
not want exercised the right of self-defense before an armed attack had
occurred.”65 Indeed, only a narrow right of self-defense would be consistent
with other provisions of the Charter.66 In addition to the general prohibition
on force in Article 2(4), the provisions of Chapter VII and Chapter VIII
giving the Security Council principal authority over peace and security
made sense only in the case of a narrow exception for the use of force by
States acting independently of the Council.67

57. Id. arts. 39, 42.
58. See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (1958), 695-696; see
also, George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties
Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 321, 351 (1998).
59. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
60. In 1947 parties to the Rio Treaty provided in Article 3: “The High Contracting Parties agree
that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all
the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in
meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” Rio Treaty, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, Rio-U.S., art. 3, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681.
61. Walker, supra note 58, at 351-53.
62. Id. at 351.
63. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United
DEP’T
OF
STATE:
OFFICE
OF
THE
HISTORIAN,
Nations,
Volume
I,
U.S.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v01 (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Bert V. A. Röling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, pp. 4-5 (A. Cassese ed., 1986). (“[M]ost commentators
begin the process of exegesis with Art. 2(4), in deference to the paramount concern of the Charter with
the maintenance of ‘international peace and security.’ It then becomes desirable to interpret the word
“force” in Art. 2(4) at least widely enough to ensure that any significant use of military force is banned;
and to give the acknowledged exception created by Art. 51 a correspondingly narrow meaning.”); see
also, Dominika Švarc, Redefining Imminence: The Use of Force Against Threats and Armed Attacks in
the Twenty-First Century, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 175, 177 (2006).
67. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 52, ¶ 3, 53 ¶ 1.
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Requiring an armed attack placed an important control on a use of force
that had not been authorized by the Security Council.68 The defending state
is in a position to point to open, public evidence of the need to respond with
force.69 Other, less tangible or immediate threats must be submitted to the
collective scrutiny of the Security Council.70 The design relies on collective
deliberation of the Council as a better process for determining threats to the
peace than would be case of the unilateral decision of the potential victim.71
States claim one additional basis for resort to force relevant to this
discussion, invitation or consent.72 Iran accepted the Syrian government’s
invitation to assist in suppressing the dozens of armed militias challenging
it, including ISIS.73 Invitation does not appear in the Charter and on its face
conflicts with Article 2(4), but the practice is common.74 States have on
dozens of occasions since 1945, cited a right to assist governments in
suppressing internal armed rebellion.75 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has considered cases on the question of illegal use of force that also
featured invitations.76 The court has not taken up the legality of invitations
in any detail. It clearly implies, however, in Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Armed Activities) and Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua) v. United States that
invitation is a lawful basis for the use of force abroad when the invitation is
issued by a government in control of most of the state or at least fighting
with a likelihood of success in maintaining control against armed non-state
actors seeking to oust it.77
68.
69.
70.
71.

Švarc, supra note 66, at 171, 177.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
Id. art. 39.
Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Arc toward Justice and Peace, in ARCS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM A. SCHABAS 469 (Margaret M. deGuzman & Diane Marie Amann,
eds., 2018).
72. Max Byrne, Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘Intervention by Invitation’ as
a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia & Yemen, 3 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 97, 98
(2016).
73. Iran’s Presence in Syria on Syrians’ Invitation, MEHR NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 14, 2018, 4:41
PM),
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132159/Iran-s-presence-in-Syria-on-Syrians-invitation.
74. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
75. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the
Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 189 (1986).
76. E.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep. 168, 194 (Dec. 19); Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis: An International
Law Perspective, 74 ZaöRV 367, 372 (2014).
77. Armed Activities, 2005 ICJ Rep. at 212; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 25, 78 (June 27). The right to issue an
invitation to join in collective self-defense to an armed attack from a foreign State is expressly provided
for in UN Charter Article 51. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 75, at 213, 221; Marxsen, supra note 76, at
375-77; see generally BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 284
(1999).
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In Armed Activities, the ICJ also found that withdrawing consent
requires no formal, express evidence; indirect indications suffice.78 That
finding is consistent with the position that a high bar exists to the lawful
exercise of armed force by a state on another state’s territory under a
justification of invitation or consent.79 Indirect and even ambiguous
evidence that consent has been withdrawn is sufficient to end it.80 Syria
plainly wants Iran’s assistance, so if Iran had attacked ISIS as part of its
effort at ending the organization’s hold on Syria, the attacks would arguably
have been lawful.81 The announcement that the purpose of the June 2017
missile strikes was revenge for ISIS terrorism raises questions of their
legality.82 The fact that the missile strikes involved a far greater quantity of
force further distinguishes the attacks from the assistance offered with
Syria’s consent.83 Even if Syria gave its consent, as will be discussed
below, it could not authorize a use of military force for punishment or
revenge.84
The ICJ has ruled on other aspects of the use of force beyond
invitation.85 In the Nicaragua case, it held that an armed attack triggering
the right of self-defense must be significant—it must be more than a mere
frontier incident.86 The court found the additional obligations to limit the
use of force in the term “inherent right” (“droit natural” in the French
version) of UN Charter Article 51 as a reference to additional, restrictive
principles found in international law outside the Charter.87 Among the
important rules of general international law are the general principles of
necessity, proportionality, and attribution. 88 Necessity requires that any use
of force in self-defense be undertaken only as a last resort and where there
is a high likelihood that using military force will succeed in accomplishing
78. Armed Activities, 2005 ICJ Rep. at 197.
79. Id. at 194-95 (stating that Uganda claimed that in response to a threat by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, it exercised its sovereign right of self-defense to augment its
forces in eastern Congo).
80. Id. at 198 (stating that no particular formalities were required for the Democratic Republic of
the Congo to withdraw its consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on its soil).
81. See David W. Lesch, Iran Is Taking Over Syria. Can Anyone Stop It?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/opinion/iran-syria.html.
82. See Iran Fires Missiles at ISIL Positions in Eastern Syria, supra note 11.
83. Syria
Crisis:
Where
Key
Countries
Stand,
BBC
(Oct.
30,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587 (stating that Iran was believed to have spent
billions of dollars to support President Assad, provide military advisors, and to subsidize weapons, lines
of credit, and oil transfers).
84. Michael Wood, International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice?, 53
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 345, 352 (2013).
85. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 103 (discussing the right of self-defense in cases of armed
attack which has already occurred).
86. Id. at 103-04.
87. Id. at 93.
88. Id. at 94, 65.
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the legitimate objective of defense.89 Proportionality requires that even
when the requirements of necessity are met, military force must not impose
a disproportionate cost on the state responsible for the armed attack
compared with the injury to the defending state. 90 Attribution requires that
force may only be used on the territory of a foreign sovereign state where
the government of that state is responsible for the wrongful armed attack.
Some scholars have attempted to assert that attacking a single individual or
armed group found on the territory of a state is somehow different than
attacking the state itself. That is an erroneous characterization under the
law of state responsibility and the right of territorial integrity. A state may
not be attacked because of the presence of armed terrorist organizations
uncontrolled by the state.91 The territorial state may have failed to exercise
due diligence with respect to controlling non-state actors.92 Failure of due
diligence, however, does not give rise to the right to use force in selfdefense.93
The prohibition on the use of force is today discerned as more than
mere treaty law or even customary international law. It is widely
categorized as jus cogens or a peremptory norm.94 Peremptory norms are
the international community’s highest ethical principles.
They are
consistent with ancient and universal moral principles. No derogation from
these norms is permitted through the operation of standard treaty and
customary international law processes for creation and modification of
rules. No derogation is permitted by, for example, expanding exceptions.
Peremptory norms can always reach more conduct, never less. This point is
easy to grasp when other jus cogens norms are considered. In addition to
the prohibition on the use of force, genocide, slavery, torture, and apartheid
are prohibited.95 The logic of jus cogens mandates that these prohibitions
89. Oil Platforms (Iran v U.S.), Judgment, 2003 ICJ Rep. 161, 198 (Nov. 6). (stating that the
conditions for the exercise of the right of self-defense are well-settled and require that self-defense
warrants only measures which are proportional to the armed attacked and necessary to respond to it).
90. Id. at 198-199. For more on proportionality, see Georg Nolte, Multipurpose Self-Defence,
Proportionality Disoriented: A Response to David Kretzmer, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 283 (2013).
91. Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. at 222-23, 268 (noting that while Uganda claimed to have
acted in self-defense, it never claimed that it had been subjected to an armed attack by Congo. The
series of attacks on Uganda were not attributable to Congo on the evidence.); see also James Gathii,
Irregular Forces and Self-defense Under the UN Charter, in 37 INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.: WHAT IS
WAR? AN INVESTIGATION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 97, 97 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2012) (arguing that
expanding the right of self-defense to include attacks by irregular forces whose conduct is not
attributable to a State would be inconsistent with earlier Security Council criticisms of self-defense.)
92. Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. at 231 (stating that Uganda would be responsible for any
lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other
actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account).
93. See Gathii, supra note 91.
94. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 100.
95. Jan Wouters; Sten Verhoeven, The Prohibition of Genocide as a Norm of Jus Cogens and its
Implications for the Enforcement of the Law of Genocide, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 401, 404 (2005); Erika
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can never be narrowed as that would result in derogation. Slavery, for
example, was once thought to involve only cases where one person
purported to legally own another.96 The international community now
discerns that slavery exists in a broader set of circumstances.There is de
facto slavery, not just de jure.
The prohibition on the use of force plainly belongs in this small set of
extraordinary legal norms. Historians of the international law on the use of
force commonly trace the prohibition on force to the teaching of St.
Augustine, a fifth century North African bishop. Augustine sought to move
his congregation away from the strict pacifism being practiced by many
early Christians, drawing on Greek and Roman philosophy and law
justifying resort to war to achieve peace.97 Peace was also among the
highest Christian values, so Augustine reasoned that peace could be a just
cause of war for Christians.98 He concluded that using limited war when
necessary as “a means of preserving or restoring peace” could be acceptable
to Christians desiring to conform their conduct to their religious belief.99 In
addition to self-defense, Augustine considered it just to fight to restore what
was stolen, to respond to wrongdoing in an attempt to prevent future
wrongs, as well as to promote Christianity.100
Through the centuries, it became clear that Augustine’s concept of “just
war” could be read flexibly.101 Christians began fighting not just in
situations of extremis but to promote the Church or a king.102 Fighting in
the Crusades or fighting to conquer and colonize all became justified under
de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its Implications for
National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 97, 97-98 (2004); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68, 72 n.46 (1996).
96. Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOW. L. J. 239, 240 (2009)
(stating that the League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926 defined slavery as “the status or
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.”).
97. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (Michael Byers, trans. &
rev., 2000) (Latin re-phrasing omitted) (stating Augustine’s teaching transformed Antiquity’s
conceptions of just war, based primarily on Cicero’s work, and that it was concerned with the restoration
of peace).
98. Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33
AM. J. INT’L L. 665, 669-70 (1939) (stating that the teachings of the numerous canonists who elaborated
the doctrine of the just war align with the principles laid down by the Fathers of the Church, particularly
in their emphasis that one of the principal conditions of the justness of war was the restoration of peace).
99. GREWE, supra note 97, at 107.
100. von Elbe, supra note 98, at 667 (stating that the Christian concept of the just war furnishes
rules for limiting and guarding it in accordance with the precepts of the new religion); GREWE, supra
note 97, at 106-07 (Latin re-rephrasing omitted).
101. Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE
IN THE WESTERN WORLD 40, 43 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) (stating that many European
statesmen proclaimed with pride that they fought principally to advance the cause of their church and
that King Phillip was accused by the pope of wishing to attack England solely for political reasons).
102. Id. at 43.
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the argument that once all the world converted to Christianity, peace would
prevail and all fighting would end.103 Christian warriors succeeded in
establishing the Holy Roman Empire that lasted from the crowning of
Charlemagne in 800 to the end of the Thirty Years’ War with the signing of
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 104
During this long period, scholars continued to grapple with the linked
issues of the morality and legality of war.105 In the Middle Ages, St.
Thomas Aquinas systematized Augustine’s work, giving it a law-like
form.106 From his writing, the restrictive approach to war was adopted into
international law as this legal system took its modern form in response to
the Protestant Reformation.107 Resort to war required a just cause as the
fundamental pre-requisite, such as self-defense. Lawful war was always a
last resort that had to have a prospect of succeeding and would not cause
disproportionate injury.108
The Reformation and the Scientific Revolution both heavily impacted
law, suppressing resort to religious teaching. 109 Law was increasingly
considered to require positive, material proof of its rules. Legislation,
treaties, and rules of common law or customary law fit the requirement but
not higher ethical norms, such as the prohibition on resort to force.
Nevertheless, the principles of the just war persisted. In many accounts of
the nineteenth century, scholars tend to conclude that the rise of positivism
meant the end of legal restraint on force. The record shows, however, that
government officials and legal scholars in Europe, as well as North and
South America continued to recognize the Just War Doctrine. Few
European governments ever failed to offer justifications in terms of some
just or lawful cause.
With the suppression of religious teaching, new explanations were
needed for the understanding that law is binding. Most legal systems,
103. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 20 (2d ed. 1954)
(stating that part of the Church’s crusade legislation was partly intended to expand ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over the estates of the crusaders).
104. Id. at 115 (stating that the Thirty Years’ War was ended by the Peace of Westphalia after
negotiations had dragged on for more than three years).
105. Charles J. Reid, Jr., John T. Noonan, Jr., on the Catholic Conscience and War: Negre v.
Larsen, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881, 882 (2001) (stating that throughout its long history, Catholic justwar theory has required believers to examine the morality of state decisions in favor of war).
106. von Elbe, supra note 98, at 669-70.
107. Michael Walzer, The Triumph of Just War (and the Dangers of Success), 69 SOC. RES. 925,
926-27 (stating that world rulers embraced the theory of just war and writers Grotius and Pufendorf
incorporated just war theory into international law).
108. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 555-56 (2d ed. 1997).
109. See e.g. Martyn Shuttleworth, Science and the Enlightenment, EXPLORABLE,
https://explorable.com/science-and-enlightenment (last visited Apr. 18, 2018); See John Witte, Jr., The
Legacy of the Protestant Reformation in Modern Law, POL. THEORY NETWORK (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://politicaltheology.com/the-legacy-of-the-protestant-reformation-in-modern-law/.
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including international law, began on the basis that God requires obedience
to law. In international law, this divine command concept was part of a
sophisticated theory known as natural law. As the scientific revolution
impacted European thinkers, they looked to material evidence to support
reasoning of all kinds. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
international law scholars argued strenuously for material or positive
evidence of the law. They wanted to see consent to treaties or rules of
customary international law. They had no time for ideas incorporating
acceptance, beauty, belief, or any other extra-positive source. Despite
crusading efforts by proponents of “legal science”, however, natural law
never disappeared.110 Indeed, in recent years, new interest has emerged in
understanding the place of natural law in the international legal system.111
Interestingly, the natural law doctrine of restricted war continued to be
espoused even by some pure positivists.112 The Austrian, Hans Kelsen, said
to be the greatest legal mind of the twentieth century by Harvard Law
School’s mid-century dean, Dean Roscoe Pound, lent his considerable talent
to the legal problem of war. He wrote that the contemporary Just War
Doctrine was found in the treaties restricting war, including the Treaty of
Versailles of 1919, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the 1945 United
Nations Charter. Kelsen cited Augustine, Aquinas, and Grotius as the
original authors of the prohibition, a moral and legal norm of jus cogens.113
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States, United
Kingdom, and Australia, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan instituted a
thorough review of the UN Charter rules on the use of force.114 He
determined the review was necessary following criticisms of his conclusion
that the three states had violated Article 2(4). Two years later, UN members
reaffirmed Article 2(4) during the 2005 United Nations World Summit in
New York.115 The World Summit Outcome document contains these
provisions:
110. See generally 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-87 (1905) (demonstrating that
natural law is still in existence).
111. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Diss. Op. Cançado Trindade), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 86, at 97, 99, 165, 167 (Feb. 3) (especially his dissenting opinion in Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening)).
112. Hendrik Simon, The Myth of Liberum Ius Ad Bellum: Justifying War in 19th Century Legal
Theory and Political Practice, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113-136 (2018).
113. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 330 (Anders Wedberg trans.
1945, reprinted 1999, 2011). See also, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peace and War, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds.,
2012).
114. Lessons of Iraq War Underscore Importance of UN Charter – Annan, UN NEWS (Sept. 16,
2004) https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/09/115352-lessons-iraq-war-underscore-importance-un-charterannan.
115. G.A. Res. 60/1, at ¶¶ 78-79 (Sept. 16, 2005).
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78. We reiterate the importance of promoting and strengthening the
multilateral process and of addressing international challenges and
problems by strictly abiding by the Charter and the principles of
international law, and further stress our commitment to
multilateralism.116
79. We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are
sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace
and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security
Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore
international peace and security. We stress the importance of acting
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.117
THE PROHIBITION ON ARMED REPRISALS
A long-standing interpretation of the UN Charter principles on the use
of force is that armed reprisals are unlawful.118 Armed reprisals do not fit
the Article 51 exception for the use of force and would, therefore, require
Security Council authorization.119
The Security Council has never
authorized a reprisal. Arguments asserting that reprisals were once
unlawful—but are no longer due to evolving state practice or new
interpretations—must fail. Such arguments overlook that the prohibition on
reprisals is part of the jus cogens prohibition on the use of force permitting
no derogation.
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, limited evidence suggests that
measures short of war, such as reprisals, were regulated under different
principles than the Just War Doctrine.120 Regardless, armed reprisals were
subject to a restrictive legal regime throughout the history of international
law.121 Armed reprisals were lawful only if in response to a prior wrong.122
Other restrictions applied as well.123 This law is well known, thanks in part
to a 1928 arbitral award in the Naulilaa case between Portugal and

116. Id. at ¶ 78.
117. Id. at ¶ 79.
118. Id. at ¶ 77.
119. U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence [sic] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations . . . .”).
120. O’Connell, supra note 113, at 278. One such principle is the sovereignty doctrine in which
the decision of whether to enter into war was left to the decision of the individual leader of the state.
States were encouraged to use various means of peaceful settlement instead of resorting to war. See id.
121. U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1.
122. Id.
123. See generally Arbitration Award (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1011 (1949)
(emphasizing the other restrictions that are applicable).
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Germany.124 The case was heard by a tribunal established under the Treaty
of Versailles and involved events on the eve of the First World War.125 In
1914, German and Portuguese troops met on the border of their neighboring
colonies, today Namibia and Angola.126 Owing to a misunderstanding—
perhaps due to poor translation—the Portuguese killed three German
officers.127 Germany responded with retaliatory attacks against several
Portuguese outposts.128
Portugal claimed these attacks violated
international law.129 The tribunal agreed, finding Germany failed to meet
the three conditions of lawful reprisals; first, Portugal had committed no
prior wrong.130 Even if it had committed a prior wrong, Germany was
required to give notice of the wrong and demand a remedy, attempting to
resolve the dispute peacefully.131 If the attempt failed, Germany’s response
had to be proportional to the wrong.132 Again, it was not proportional.133
With the adoption of the Charter in 1945, these rules regarding reprisals
became applicable only to coercive measures not involving the use of armed
force, known today as counter-measures.134 In the Air Services Arbitration
of 1978 between the United States and France, the arbitrators used the term
“countermeasure” when referring to a wrong committed by the U.S. against
France that was justifiable owing to the prior wrong committed by
France.135 The U.S. had fulfilled the other elements of the Naulilaa formula
as well.136 The U.S. notified France of its view a wrong had been
committed and of the need for a remedy.137 The countermeasures instituted
subsequent to the notice were found proportional to the wrong.138
The UN International Law Commission confirmed the Air Services
tribunal’s analysis in its Articles on State Responsibility, which was
concluded in 2001 through the acceptance by the General Assembly.139 The
124. State Responsibility, 2 U.N.Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 125,136 (1964) (holding that “no
violation of international law had occurred on the part of Portugal justifying the German reprisal. [Thus,]
[t]he reprisal was [a] breach of international law . . . .”).
125. Julia Pfeil, Naulilaa Arbitration (Portugal v. Germany), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
126. State Responsibility, supra note 124, at 137.
127. Id.
128. Port. v. Ger., 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards.
129. State Responsibility, supra note 124, at 137.
130. Pfeil, supra note 125.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Port. v. Ger., 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards.
134. Air Services Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 417, 427 (Dec. 9).
135. Id. at 443.
136. Id. at 443-44.
137. Id. at 446.
138. Id. at 444.
139. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 49 (Dec. 12, 2001) (allows for certain countermeasures to be taken in
limited circumstances).
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
include detailed provisions on countermeasures.140 The Articles provide
that countermeasures are allowed “against a State which is responsible for
an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with
its obligations.”141 The Articles make clear, however, that the legal regime
of countermeasures does not in any way modify “the obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations[.]”142 Lawful measures taken in response to a prior wrong include
non-performance of treaty obligations or the imposition of economic
sanctions.143 They do not include armed attacks.144
The United Nations Security Council has also made it clear that armed
reprisals violate the Charter.145 In Resolution 188 of 1964 the Council
condemned the United Kingdom’s bombing of Fort Harib in Yemen.146 The
resolution states that reprisals are “incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.”147 This point was made again in the
General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.148 Among
the fundamental rights and duties of states, is the “duty to refrain from acts
of reprisal involving the use of force” against other states.149 In 2001, the
General Assembly accepted the International Law Commission’s (ILC)
Articles on State Responsibility, which include the restriction on
countermeasures involving the use of force discussed above.150
The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, has also found armed reprisals unlawful.151 In its 1996
advisory opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
court said that “armed reprisals in time of peace . . . are considered to be
unlawful.”152 In the Oil Platforms case, the International Court of Justice
further held that U.S. attacks on Iranian sites were not lawful acts of self140. Id. arts. 49-54.
141. Id. art. 51(1)(a).
142. Id. art. 53(1)(a).
143. Id. art. 51(2); see also Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 7.9, 1995,
1869 UNTS 14, 21 (allowing the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body to authorize a
member state to impose countermeasures when another state is not complying with its trade obligations).
144. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 50.
145. S.C. Res. 188, ¶ 1 (Apr. 9, 1964).
146. Burton M. Leiser, The Morality of Reprisals, 85 ETHICS 159, 159 n.1 (1975).
147. S.C. Res. 188, ¶ 1 (It is noteworthy, and to the United Kingdom’s credit, that it did not veto
the resolution.).
148. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970).
149. Id.
150. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 50.
151. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 95, at
246 (July 8).
152. Id.
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defense because of their retaliatory nature.153 They were not undertaken to
repel an on-going use of force.154
Despite the clear positions of the Security Council and General
Assembly respecting the illegality of reprisals by 1986, Ronald Reagan
ordered an air attack on Libyan military sites in Tripoli and Benghazi that
followed ten days after a terrorist bombing of a disco in Berlin.155 Three
people died in the disco attack; two were American service members. As
many as forty people died in the U.S. raids.156 The U.S. said it had evidence
that Libya planned more acts of terrorism.157
On this basis, U.S.
government lawyers and scholars presented the argument that the U.S.
actions, in contrast to Libya’s, were lawful as self-defense under Article 51
of the Charter.158 In other words, the U.S. attempted to distinguish its
attacks from unlawful armed reprisals and terrorism.159 The case simply did
not fit the requirements of self-defense.160 To begin with, the Berlin
incident did not amount to a significant armed attack per the requirement set
out in the Nicaragua case.161 Evidence of the necessity for military action
in self-defense owing to future attacks was also inadequate.162 Whatever
vague evidence the U.S. had, amounted to criminal plots, not use of armed
force.163 The UN General Assembly condemned the U.S. attacks.164
One interesting point for this discussion from the attack on Tripoli is
that the Reagan administration made a serious attempt to justify its actions
in terms of the UN Charter.165 During the Cold War, the U.S. was careful to
restrict legal arguments to the use of force accepted under international
law.166 Facts were often manipulated, but rarely interpretations of the
law.167 Such care for preserving the integrity of the Charter noticeably
153. Iran v. U.S., 2003 ICJ Rep. at 199.
154. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 893-894
(2002).
155. 1986: U.S. Launches Air Strikes in Libya, BBC (Apr. 15, 1986),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/3975455.stm.
156. Id.
157. Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and
Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 548–49 (1999).
158. Id. at 537.
159. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air Operation Against
Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 933 (1987).
160. Id. at 949.
161. Lobel, supra note 157, at 541.
162. Greenwood, supra note 159, at 947.
163. Id. at 954.
164. G.A. Res. 41/38, at 2 (Nov. 20, 1986).
165. Greenwood, supra note 159, at 949.
166. Bruno Simma, NATO, The UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EURO. J. INT’L L. 1,
3, 4, 17 (1999).
167. Byrne, supra note 72, at 98. The United States and the Soviet Union consistently invoked
invitation to justify using force in Hungary, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia,
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diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of worries that
the Soviets would adopt the same attenuated justifications.168
Paying little heed to the actual terms of the Charter or ICJ
interpretations, President Bill Clinton ordered unlawful armed reprisals on
several occasions.169 In 1993, he ordered an attack on government buildings
in Baghdad in response to an alleged plot to assassinate former President
George H.W. Bush.170 In 1996, when Iraqi troops moved against Kurdish
separatists in northern Iraq, Clinton ordered attacks in southern Iraq.171
International law prohibits assassination, and murder of any kind is, of
course, unlawful. In U.S. criminal law, the mere planning to carry out such
an act is criminal, even if no injury results.172 These are crimes however,
not violations of Article 2(4) that give rise to the right of self-defense under
Article 51.173 Article 2(4) prohibits military force by states, not every
violent crime with an international dimension, even one involving sovereign
states.174 Moreover, the use of force in self-defense to a violation of Article
2(4) is no longer available days or weeks later in the absence of on-going
armed attacks.175
With respect to Clinton’s attacks in support of Kurdish separatists in
Iraq, the U.S. and UK actually tried to argue that these actions were lawful
under the UN Security Council Resolutions that had been adopted against
Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.176 France and Russia
disagreed that those resolutions authorized the use of force in response to
incidents with little connection to Kuwait’s liberation.177 Even if the U.S.
and UK did have some sort of Security Council authorization to bomb Iraq
for a dozen years after its withdrawal from Kuwait, bombing southern Iraq

Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATION LAW AND THE USE
182-84 (2018).
168. Simma, supra note 166, at 14, 17. A prime example of the new attitude was the fact the U.S.
issued no official justification for the first time since 1945 for using military force when it waged the 78day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 to force the removal of Serb forces from its province of
Kosovo. Mary Ellen O’Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense,
776 SCHOLARLY WORKS 1, 56 (2002).
169. John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq’s
Intelligence Headquarters, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 242 (1994); Louis Fisher, Military
Action against Iraq, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 793, 793 (1998).
170. Quigley, supra note 169, at 241-42.
171. Id.; see also Fisher, supra note 169, at 794.
172. 18 U.S. C. § 1117 (1994).
173. U.N. Charter arts. 2 ¶ 4, 51.
174. Id. at ¶ 4.
175. INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (David Lee ed.,
5th ed, 2015) 35, 35 n.10, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2015_Ch4.pdf.
176. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3245 mtg., at 21–22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (June 27, 1993).
177. Alex J. Bellamy, International Law and the War with Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 497, 508
(2003).
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to retaliate for action against the Kurds violated the principles of necessity
and proportionality.178
Clinton also carried out unlawful reprisals following terrorist attacks on
the United States embassies in East Africa.179 On August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda
operatives detonated two truck bombs targeting United States embassies in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.180 Over 200 people lost their
lives because of the bombings, and many more were injured.181 The vast
majority were Tanzanians and Kenyans.182 A U.S. government committee
investigating the attacks, found the embassies lacked proper security. 183
This was a noteworthy finding given that just five years earlier Al Qaeda
had carried out an attack on the World Trade Center in New York in which
six people died, and more than a thousand were injured.184 From that
moment on, the U.S. had plenty of notice of the character and aims of Al
Qaeda.185 A number of the Trade Center attackers had been arrested and
convicted.186 The U.S. also succeeded in arresting and prosecuting three
people linked to the embassy attacks.187
Rather than enhance security and redouble law enforcement efforts
against Al Qaeda, measures known to succeed against terrorism, Clinton
made a fateful decision two weeks after the embassy bombings.188 He
ordered missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan.189 This was a significant
step beyond Reagan’s attack on Libya for state-sponsored terrorism and
178. See Iran v. U.S., 2003 ICJ Rep. 183, 199 (explaining that “necessity and proportionality must
be observed” to grant a right of self-defense). Perhaps more problematic is the fact that self-defense can
only be invoked when force is used against the nation claiming self-defense or in a collective defense
arrangement. Id. The United States was not attacked by Iraq, nor was the United States in a collective
defense arrangement with the Kurds. Id.
179. See Steven Erlanger, After the Attacks: The Diplomacy; Missile Strikes are Seen as New
Strategy for U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/23/world/after-theattacks-the-diplomacy-missile-strikes-are-seen-as-new-strategy-for-us.html; see also In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2008).
180. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d at 180.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Philip Shenon, Many Flaws Blamed in Embassy Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/08/world/many-flaws-blamed-in-embassy-attacks.html.
184. Jesse Greenspan, Remembering the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, HISTORY.COM, Feb.
26, 2013,
https://www.history.com/news/remembering-the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing.
185. Id.
186. Richard Bernstein, Explosion at the Twin Towers; 4 Are Convicted in Bombing at the World
TIMES
(Mar.
5,
1994),
Trade
Center
that
Killed
6,
Stunned
U.S.,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/05/nyregion/explosion-twin-towers-4-are-convicted-bombing-worldtrade-center-that-killed-6.html?pagewanted=all.
187. 1998 US Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 9, 2017, 11:11 AM), \
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/index.html.
188. Jamie McIntyre, et al., U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, CNN (Aug. 21,
1998, 5:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02/.
189. Id.
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clearly conflicted with the UN Charter.190 In Afghanistan, the attacks took
place in Khost, south of the capital Kabul, and in Jalalabad, east of Kabul.191
The targets included an Al Qaeda base.192 In Sudan, the U.S. declared the
target to be a “chemical weapons related” facility and that it produced
chemicals used in the manufacturing of VX nerve gas.193
Speaking to the nation, Clinton announced that he “ordered our armed
forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan
because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security.”194
He continued:
I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why
it was necessary. Our target was terror. Our mission was clear - to
strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by
Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier
of international terrorism in the world today.195
“Today,” the president declared, “we have struck back.”196
Clinton did not directly cite Article 51 nor could he plausibly; the air
strikes followed terrorist crimes, isolated events that were not part of ongoing, state sponsored use of force in violation of Article 2(4) and triggering
Article 51.197 Clinton had no firm evidence of any future plans even if the
truck bombs could amount to the significant armed attack required to trigger
Article 51.198 Further, the air strikes were on two sovereigns with no legal
responsibility for the embassy bombings.199 As for necessity, missile strikes
in retaliation for non-state actor terrorist crimes have no connection to
190. Shenon, supra note 183.
191. McIntyre, supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. Id. VX nerve gas, or methylphosphonothioic acid, is similar to sarin gas in that both
chemicals disrupt the functions of muscles and nerves in the body, leading to death in a relatively short
AM.
SCIENTISTS,
amount
of
time.
Types
of
Chemical
Weapons,
FED’N
https://fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/cwagents.html. (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). The use of any
chemical weapons violates the jus ad bello, or laws of war because of their indiscriminate and
fundamentally inhumane effects. See generally id.
194. President Clinton Strikes Against Terrorist Speech, AP ARCHIVE (Aug. 20, 1998),
http://www.aparchive.com/search?startd=&endd=&allFilters=&query=president+clinton+strikes+against
+terrorist+speech&advsearchStartDateFilter=&advsearchEndDateFilter=&searchFilterHdSDFormat=All
&searchFilterDigitized=All&searchFiltercolorFormat=All&searchFilteraspectratioFormat=All; see AP
Archive, USA: President Clinton Strikes Against Terrorist Speech, YOUTUBE (Jul. 23, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EyDJVUSbgR0.
195. AP Archive, supra note 194.
196. Id.; Barton Gellman & Dana Priest, U.S. Strikes Terrorist-Linked Sites in Afghanistan,
Factory in Sudan, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/strikes082198.htm.
197. U.N. Charter arts. 2 ¶ 4, 51.
198. Id.
199. McIntyre, supra note 188.
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successful suppression of terrorism. The evidence indicates they are
counter-productive.200 Al Qaeda went on to attack the U.S. on 9/11 as well
as a dozen other states.201 Al Qaeda was emboldened by the U.S. response,
treating them as a military organization that could challenge the United
States at the inter-state level.202
Curiously, Clinton was also emboldened.203 Many states condemned
the air strike on Sudan in part because the site bombed was not a chemical
weapons plant and due to lack of evidence justifying the United States’
actions.204 Few states criticized the lack of a legal right to resort to force.205
So Clinton, embroiled in an impeachment trial over having lied to
investigators regarding sex with a White House intern, attacked Serbia in
1999 for seventy-eight days to force the Serbs to pull their forces from the
province of Kosovo.206 The intervention was under the auspices of NATO
and clearly violated Article 2(4).207 It was not, however, a reprisal.208 It
was an act of aggression.209 Serbia actively attempted to defend itself
resulting in an armed conflict.210 Serbia’s defensive actions were the part of
attempts to create a legal justification for Kosovo after the fact.211 Sweden
had a committee look into the legal and factual questions surrounding the
war, and Canada formed a commission that issued something called the
“Responsibility to Protect,” a variation on the old concept of “humanitarian
intervention” to create a new exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition.212
These ex post facto efforts were in vain. The rules on resort to force are jus
cogens, meaning no derogation is permitted. New exceptions and
interpretations narrowing the reach of a jus cogens prohibition are forms of
derogation with no legal validity.
200. Lobel, supra note 157, at 555.
201. US
Rocked
by
Terror
Attacks,
BBC
(Sep.
11,
2001,
9:54
PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1537469.stm.
202. America at War: Post 9/11 Timeline, PBS (June 29, 2004),
http://www.pbs.org/flashpointsusa/20040629/infocus/topic_01/timeline_sep2001.html. (last visited Mar.
18, 2018).
203. Erlanger, supra note 179.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. William Clinton, Pres. of U.S., Clinton Justifies U.S. Involvement in Kosovo, (May 13,
1999), in Transcript: Clinton Justifies Involvement in Kosovo, CNN (May, 13 1999, 1:23 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/05/13/clinton.kosovo/transcript.html.
207. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
208. Reprisals, 12 Dig. Int’l L. 148, 149 (1971).
209. U.N. Charter art. 39.
210. See Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio
Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 793 (1999).
211. U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.7 (Sep. 21, 1998).
212. See INTERN’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT 2 (Dec. 2001); see generally Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the
Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L. J. 703, 707-08 (2006).
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In 2000, Al Qaeda struck again, blasting a hole in the side of the U.S.S.
Cole docked in Aden harbor in Yemen.213 Seventeen U.S. sailors died.214
This time Clinton did not carry out any major retaliatory strike but
authorized the CIA to use a newly weaponized Predator drone to hunt for
Bin Laden and assassinate him and everyone near him with Hellfire
missiles.215 Clinton interpreted the anti-assassination executive order that
had restricted such killing since the end of the Vietnam War, as not
applicable to drone strikes.216 No public evidence is available as to whether
Clinton had any concern about the international law against assassination
and the use of military force on the territory of a sovereign state, regardless
of launch vehicle.
The CIA did not, of course, succeed in killing bin Laden in 2000.217 He
went on to order his followers to carry out the 9/11 attacks.218 President
Bush, in office just eight months, followed Clinton’s lead and authorized
both a major military operation against Afghanistan and a secret mission to
kill members of Al Qaeda using drones and other techniques, including a
car bomb.219 By 2009, these tactics in clear violation of international law,
had failed to kill bin Laden or slow the pace of terrorist attacks.220 Rather,
new groups related to Al Qaeda or inspired by it began violent action across
Africa and Asia.221 Nevertheless, the new administration of Barack Obama
carried on the war in Afghanistan, doubled drone strikes, and continued at
varying levels to fight in the civil war in Iraq that had erupted following the
unlawful invasion by the U.S., UK, and Australia in 2003.222 The Bush
administration attempted to justify the invasion as Clinton had for the air
strikes in 1998 in Iraq, by invoking the Security Council’s Resolutions of
1990–1991.223 Few experts have found this argument credible.
In 2013, perhaps finally concluding that drone attacks were proving
counter-productive on many levels in the effort to suppress terrorism,
213. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 190 (authorized ed.
2004).
214. Id.
215. Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted Killing – A Historical and Post-Bin Laden Legal
Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 259, 261 (2012).
216. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, supra note 213, at 132, 132 n.123.
217. Death of Osama bin Laden: Fact Facts, CNN (Nov. 4, 2017, 1:12 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/death-of-osama-bin-laden-fast-facts/index.html.
218. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, supra note 213, at 285.
219. Vlasic, supra note 215, at 290.
220. Id. at 299.
221. Id. at 293-94.
222. Id. at 292.
223. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701 mtg., at 2–17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003); see also Chip
Gibbons, When Iraq Was Clinton’s War, JACOBIN, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/05/war-iraq-billclinton-sanctions-desert-fox/.
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Obama’s lawyers developed their own set of “guidelines,” which led to a
steep decline in attacks.224 At the time the Presidential Policy Guidelines
(PPG) were developed, commentators pointed out that they did not have the
force of law and would not bind future presidents. Acknowledging that the
law actually forbids targeted killing might have caused Obama and his
advisers and lawyers to fear the repercussions of admitting to serious law
violations during his eight years in power.
Within days of his inauguration, unsurprisingly, Donald Trump
provided the military with wide latitude to decide where and when to use
military force, including drones.225 The administration did not mention the
UN Charter rules on the use of force in issuing its policy.226 No mention
was made of Obama’s PPG.227 On January 25, 2017, President Trump was
joined for dinner at the White House by Secretary of Defense James Mattis
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford.228 No legal
advisers were present.229 President Trump gave his first approval for a
specific military operation: a combined air and ground attack on a village in
Yemen.230
The operation went forward during the moonless early morning hours of
January 29 (January 28 in the U.S.); thirty U.S. Navy Seals, together with
United Arab Emirates (UAE) troops and some troops loyal to ousted
Yemeni President Hadi, employed drones launching Hellfire missiles,
helicopter gunships, Harrier jets, grenades, and small arms.231 The village
of Ghaylil, in the remote Bayda province, was the target. Men of the village
had been fighting on the same side as the U.S., in favor of the Saudi-backed
President Hadi.232 The village was fortified and the men kept guard from
attack by Houthis, who are backing Hadi’s predecessor, President Saleh,
who was supported by Iran. According to The Intercept, the residents had

224. Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the
United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, 1 (May 22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download.
225. Josh Berry, Searching for Strategy: America’s Military Under Trump, HARV. POL. REV.
(Sept. 22, 2017), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/searching-for-strategy-americas-military-undertrump/.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Basma Atassi, et al., Yemen Raid: The Plan, the Operation, and the Aftermath, CNN (Feb. 9,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/08/middleeast/yemen-raid-explainer/index.html.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Iona Craig, Death in Al Ghayil, INTERCEPT (Mar. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/03/09/women-and-children-in-yemeni-village-recall-horror-of-trumpshighly-successful-seal-raid/.
232. Id.
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no idea why the Americans and Emiratis attacked them and did so without
compunction.233
Women, ten children under the age of thirteen, and fourteen Yemeni
men died.234 A U.S. Navy Seal was killed and several more U.S. troops
were wounded. The UAE will not say if they lost anyone. A $78 million
Osprey aircraft was intentionally destroyed to prevent it from falling into
opponents’ hands. Nevertheless, President Trump’s spokesperson Sean
Spicer declared the operation “highly successful.”235 He shifted to linking
the operation to the Obama administration when the details came out of the
dozens killed, including among the children, an eight-year old American
girl.236 A video seized in the raid and meant to demonstrate its success was
ten years old.
The U.S. followed this tragedy with yet more air strikes in Yemen.237
President Trump proclaimed areas “zone[s] of active hostilities,” where the
military will not need any prior White House authorization to strike.238 The
president went on to loosen the Obama administration’s zero civilian
casualty policy in counter-insurgency operations, like those in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Syria.239 Soon after the policy change, well over 100 civilians
died in a U.S. airstrike on an apartment building in Mosul, Iraq on St.
Patrick’s Day.240 Then on April 6, Trump ordered the attack on Syria.241
“[O]n Tuesday,” the president began, “Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad
launched a horrible chemical weapons attack on innocent civilians.”242
“Using a deadly nerve agent,” he continued, “Assad choked out the lives of
helpless men, women, and children.”243 “It was a slow and brutal death”
caused by Sarin gas, that targeted “[e]ven beautiful babies.”244 The moral
outrage of the president peaked when he said that “[n]o child of God should
ever suffer such horror.”245

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Craig, supra note 231.
237. Id.
238. Mary Ellen O’Connell & Brian Boyd, Drone Technology and the Trump Doctrine, E-INT’L
REL. (June 29, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/06/29/drone-technology-and-the-trump-doctrine/.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Associated Press, Trump Says Syria Attack in ‘Vital’ US Interest, YOUTUBE (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OquzsoKJog8.
242. Trumps Full Remarks Following the U.S. Strike on Syria, CNNPOLTICS (Apr. 7, 2017, 6:14
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics/donald-trump-syria-strikes-remarks/index.html.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said President Trump’s
missile strike was “understandable.”246 Explaining Germany’s frustration,
Gabriel said that
It was almost unbearable to see that the U.N. Security Council was
not able to react clearly and unambiguously to the barbaric use of
chemical weapons against innocent people in Syria . . . . It’s
understandable that the United States have now reacted with an
attack against the military structures of the Assad regime which
caused this atrocious war crime.247
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Fancois Holland
then issued a joint press release and declared that “President Assad bears
sole responsibility for this development. His repeated use of chemical
weapons and his crimes against his own people demanded sanctions, as
called for by France and Germany as early as summer 2013 following the
massacre in Ghouta.”248 The United Kingdom and Australia described the
United States reprisal as “appropriate” and “just.”249
CONCLUSION
Lack of international condemnation, however, is not a license for the
use of force nor is moral outrage.250 Moral outrage at the Syrian
government is justified. The use of chemical weapons is always wrong. It is
little wonder that President Trump’s missile strikes were popular.251 The
world looks at Syria with horror as the inhuman violations of human rights
continue.252 We want something to be done; we want Assad and the other
perpetrators to be brought to justice.253 It is equally wrong, however, to
transform our sense of injustice into vengeance. Frustration over another
246. German Foreign Minister Says U.S. Strike on Syria ‘Understandable’, REUTERS (Apr. 7,
2017, 3:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-germany/germ. . .reignminister-says-u-s-strike-on-syria-understandable-idUSKBN1790X.
247. Id.
248. Press Release, Joint Statement by Fed. Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande of Fr.
Following the Air Strikes in Syria, The Press and Info. Office of the Fed. Gov’t (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2017/2017-04-07-erklaerungmerkel-hollande_en.html.
249. Palazzo, supra note 5.
250. U.N. Charter arts. 2 ¶ 4, 51.
251. Palazzo, supra note 5.
252. John Bacon & Jane Onyanga-Omara, ‘Reprehensible’: World Reacts to Horror of Syrian Gas
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
5,
2017,
8:43
AM),
Attack
That
Killed
Children,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/04/syrian-activists-several-dead-idlib-chemicalattack/100013666/.
253. Nick Robins-Early, Inside One Group’s Mission to Bring Assad’s Regime to Justice,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2016, 2:05 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/assad-war-crimescija_us_571ed6e6e4b0f309baee63e0.
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use of chemical weapons in Syria cannot justify the violation of a jus cogens
norm. Since the end of the Cold War, concern for the rule of law continues
to fade under the pressure of moral arguments and demands for greater
security. Yet, as explained above, the prohibition on the use of force is an
ancient and universal moral prohibition as well as legal one.254
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was right to rebuke China for
subverting the global order and undermining the sovereignty of its
neighbors.255 He pointed to India as a model.256 Would that he could point
to the United States as a model of compliance with the rules that matter
most—the restrictions on killing with military force.257

254.
255.
256.
257.

U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4.
Gaouette, supra note 35.
Id.
Id.
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